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Obviously it does for the family's of all that died and how it shaped the middle east and its ramifications on the world today - but is it a bit like now shutting the stable door now that the horse as bolted?
The major findings -
Sir John Chilcot has outlined his findings on the UK's involvement in the 2003 Iraq War and the lessons to be learned from it.
The report spans almost a decade of UK government policy decisions between 2001 and 2009.
It covers the background to the decision to go to war, whether troops were properly prepared, how the conflict was conducted and what planning there was for its aftermath, a period in which there was intense sectarian violence.
The main points are:
◾The UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.
◾Military action might have been necessary later, but in March 2003: There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time; The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.
◾Judgements about the severity of threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - known as WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
◾Intelligence had "not established beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.
◾Policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments. It was not challenged, and should have been.
◾The circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were "far from satisfactory".
◾There was "little time" to properly prepare three military brigades for deployment in Iraq. The risks were neither "properly identified nor fully exposed" to ministers, resulting in "equipment shortfalls".
◾Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were "wholly inadequate".
◾The Government failed to achieve the stated objectives it had set itself in Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict. Iraqi people suffered greatly. By July 2009, at least 150,000 Iraqis had died, probably many more. More than 1m were displaced.
◾The report sets out lessons to be learned: It found former prime minister Tony Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq; and the UK's relationship with the US does not require unconditional support.
◾It said ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge is important. As is ensuring civilian and military arms of government are properly equipped.
◾In future, all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with rigour. Decisions need to be fully implemented.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36721645
The major findings -
Sir John Chilcot has outlined his findings on the UK's involvement in the 2003 Iraq War and the lessons to be learned from it.
The report spans almost a decade of UK government policy decisions between 2001 and 2009.
It covers the background to the decision to go to war, whether troops were properly prepared, how the conflict was conducted and what planning there was for its aftermath, a period in which there was intense sectarian violence.
The main points are:
◾The UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.
◾Military action might have been necessary later, but in March 2003: There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time; The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.
◾Judgements about the severity of threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - known as WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
◾Intelligence had "not established beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.
◾Policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments. It was not challenged, and should have been.
◾The circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were "far from satisfactory".
◾There was "little time" to properly prepare three military brigades for deployment in Iraq. The risks were neither "properly identified nor fully exposed" to ministers, resulting in "equipment shortfalls".
◾Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were "wholly inadequate".
◾The Government failed to achieve the stated objectives it had set itself in Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict. Iraqi people suffered greatly. By July 2009, at least 150,000 Iraqis had died, probably many more. More than 1m were displaced.
◾The report sets out lessons to be learned: It found former prime minister Tony Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq; and the UK's relationship with the US does not require unconditional support.
◾It said ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge is important. As is ensuring civilian and military arms of government are properly equipped.
◾In future, all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with rigour. Decisions need to be fully implemented.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36721645
