Is there going to be a war?

wanderlust wrote:

Sluffy wrote:Surovikin won't be the biggest fish in all this, there most be others higher up on the inside of Putin's clique who wanted Putin overthrown.

...and those outside his clique including oligarchs in exile who may well have been involved in the planning. There will be a frantic witch hunt in the background but Prigozhin's (naive?) honesty and Lukashenko's incredible statement (in which he boasts that he was the one who saved Russia and Putin) released yesterday by Julia Davis are definitely having an impact on Telegram.
RT propagandists are naturally going flat out to dismiss Lukashenko as incidental (it was Putin who saved Russia from civil war) and continue to condemn Prigozhin as a traitor....but increasingly many on Telegram aren't buying it. Those that recognise the failings that Prigozhin's observations are accurate are stopping short of blaming Putin though - they're sticking with the "he was badly advised" line. I'm wondering if the state media will waver at any point? I doubt it as it would necessitate a discussion about corruption and military losses in the war - neither of which they've never fully accepted.

Oligarchs have always been part of the clique, that's why they've been allowed to become oligarchs in the first place!!!

Prigozhin wasn't being naive, he was given the green light to attack Putin and believed Surovikin and those above him would then take over and remove Putin.

Prigozhin was the stalking horse if you will.

As for what the Russian propaganda machine (for INTERNAL use only) is doing, why are you bothered?

The vast majority of the people in the Russian Federation simply believe the shit they are fed.  

The vast majority of the country is still feudal.  

Yes the young in big urbanised cities such as Moscow and St Petersburg will have Telegram but they aren't the ones who are fighting the war and any protests on the streets have not been seen since early last year when the invasion first started.

Of course Kremlin run state TV will obviously always big up Putin and put down everyone else including Lukashenko.

The following is what is believed to have happened - I had posted you the link to see in one of my previous posts above but you've clearly not bothered to read it - yet again - as you always do...

Lukashenko likely seeks to use the Wagner Group in Belarus to buy maneuvering space to balance against the Kremlin campaign to absorb Belarus via the Union State. Lukashenko described at length how he inserted himself into the Putin-Prigozhin conflict in a way that - if Lukashenko’s account is true - demonstrates that Lukashenko is a politically savvy actor capable of exercising influence within the upper echelons of Russian politics. Lukashenko described how he managed to broker the deal between Putin and a livid Prigozhin, who refused to answer Putin’s phone calls, by skillfully engaging both parties directly and through Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Russian FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov.[8] Lukashenko’s elaborate account suggests that Lukashenko successfully mediated a crisis within Putin‘s own inner circle that Putin could not.[9] Lukashenko intervened to mediate likely in part to signal to Putin and other senior Kremlin officials that Moscow should not trifle with Lukashenko and that Lukashenko has the ability to operate successfully and independently within Russian politics. Lukashenko’s boasting about his ability to manipulate power brokers within Putin’s innermost circle is humiliating for Putin, whether or not it is true. The fact that Putin has not challenged Lukashenko’s presentation of events and has in fact publicly thanked Lukashenko is even more humiliating.

Solovyov used his TV monologue that he starts his show with to put a spin on the Wagner situation (Western plot again) but also to big himself up as having told Prigozhin not to do it. Definitely my favourite hypocrite at the moment since Margarita Simonyan lost it.
Love the bit where the weatherman morphs into political commentator every show

Solovyov excels himself as he responds to criticism...

I don't understand why you follow such Russian shows and the hosts of them, whose job it is to feed the Russian nation, Kremlin approved ultra nationalist propaganda?

Posting such things on here is taking them completely out of context.

You 'westernise' and trivialise them into another 'nutty' Russian having yet another insane meltdown - as that is how you perceive them to be - but that is certainly NOT how they are seen by the vast amount of Russian TV viewers - who have been brainwashed by years of state controlled propaganda and nationalist sentiments to be THEIR voice of truth.

Solovyov et al are extremely dangerous mouth pieces of the state.

Julia Davis exposes then for what they are - that's why she highlights their doings - she isn't doing it for entertainment value to make people like you laugh!

She's showing the world as to the completely different mindset and way of thinking of Russia's rulers and how they have 'zombified' much of the Russian Federation it to believing that is how the world really is - and that's why people are actively 'defending the motherland' by signing up to fight - and kill - in Ukraine.

The reality in the Russian Federation is that outside the major areas of Moscow and St Petersburg, the country is basically a feudal state and largely rural and impoverished.  That's why men are joining up to fight, not to defend their country as such, but because the pay for a six month contract is many times more than they could earn in their village.  The propaganda has two main effects, the first is to paint a picture that Russia is winning the war and the second is that the war is a 'just and rightful' one.

They go to war believing that they will be earning for them a small fortune, for six months work and that they will mainly be stationed out of harms way for their duration.

If they had any idea at all what was going on, they wouldn't sign up and Putin would soon have no army left to carry on his war with.

Which would then necessitate national conscription and the public rebelling against it - otherwise Putin would have done this from day one!

If you really had any interest on the Russian state controls the public narrative you should look to informed comments such as this -

Just to give a current example of this which I said above...

The propaganda has two main effects, the first is to paint a picture that Russia is winning the war and the second is that the war is a 'just and rightful' one.

Crimea has always been a big tourist destination for Russians and obviously most haven't been made aware in Russia that it is currently being shelled by Ukraine and is in an active war zone!

The result is this...

An influx of Russian tourists to Crimea is generating serious traffic jams along one of Russia’s most important ground lines of communication, prompting Putin and other senior Russian officials to direct state resources to help tourists move closer to a zone of active hostilities. Russian Transport Minister Vitaly Saveliev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 4 to report on the situation at the entrance to the Kerch Strait Bridge and to ask for increased ferry crossings to reduce traffic jams.[75] Putin called for maximizing the use of ferries to ”normalize” the transport situation across the Kerch Strait and indicated that the Russian MoD should also lend transport assets to the area.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that the traffic at the entrance of the Kerch Strait Bridge in Krasnodar Krai has increased by 40% since July 1 and is expected to increase further in the coming days as the summer tourist season is in full swing.[77] Another Russian milblogger called on the Black Sea Fleet to provide two large landing ships for the crossing of civilian vehicles to solve traffic issues and emphasized that Russian authorities have seriously underestimated the desire of Russians to continue vacationing in occupied Crimea despite ongoing hostilities.[78] Russian authorities are dealing with pervasive civilian and transport issues to Crimea partially because of their continued refusal to fully mobilize Russian society onto a wartime footing, resulting in the continued promotion of tourism to occupied Crimea despite the fact it is a legitimate rear-area target for continued Ukrainian strikes.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2023

I don't know if anybody else is following the war but the Prigozhin story has got me fascinated - he seems to be 'untouchable' apparently - what is going on?

This for anyone interested is the latest analysis about him from the Washington 'think tank' (IST) -

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner forces are not in Belarus as of July 6, indicating that Prigozhin may be failing to uphold the deal Lukashenko mediated between Prigozhin and Russian President Vladimir Putin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24. Lukashenko and the Kremlin previously announced that Prigozhin, Putin, and Lukashenko reached an agreement that offered Prigozhin and the Wagner forces that participated in the rebellion unspecified security guarantees in Belarus.[1] The full contents of this agreement have not been revealed, but it appears that Wagner is not fulfilling its end of the deal. Lukashenko stated on July 6 that Wagner forces are currently at their permanent camps (either in Russia or in Ukraine) to which they withdrew following the Battle for Bakhmut.[2] Lukashenko added that Prigozhin is in St. Petersburg or may have even flown to Moscow on the morning of July 6. Lukashenko denied the reports that Belarus is constructing new training camps for Wagner forces and noted that Belarus offered Wagner several former Soviet military camps including some near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast.[3] Lukashenko implied that Wagner had not yet agreed to deploy to these bases and that Wagner “has a different vision for [their] deployment,” the details of which Lukashenko refused to share.[4] Lukashenko, however, denied that the deal has been terminated and noted that the question of Wagner forces’ transfer and setup “has not been decided” at the moment.[5]

Russian sources also indicated that Prigozhin is in Russia, although ISW cannot confirm Prigozhin’s whereabouts at this time. A Russian opposition outlet reported that Prigozhin’s plane landed in Rostov Oblast after flying from Moscow Oblast on the morning of July 6.[6] A St. Petersburg outlet reported on July 5 that Prigozhin personally picked up several small arms seized by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) from the FSB building in St. Petersburg on July 4.[7] The outlet also reported that Prigozhin was in Moscow over the weekend on July 1 and July 2.[8] ISW had not observed any visual confirmations in the open source that Wagner personnel deployed to Belarus at this time. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also claimed that the Kremlin does not follow Prigozhin’s movements, noting that the Kremlin cannot and does not want to follow Prigozhin.[9] Peskov’s statement is absurd given that the Kremlin and Russian security forces have the ability to detain Prigozhin or restrict his movements in Russia. It is particularly absurd if Prigozhin was actually able to collect his weapons from an FSB facility.

Lukashenko appears to be distancing himself from the deal he reportedly mediated while continuing to tout his ability to mediate between Putin and a formerly loyal lieutenant in the first place, thus still highlighting Putin’s weakness. Lukashenko demonstratively stated that Wagner and Prigozhin are Russian, and the questions about their whereabouts should not be directed to him. Lukashenko appears to be distancing himself from Wagner, and his rhetoric may suggest that he is pinning the responsibility on the Kremlin to enforce the deal. Lukashenko also continued to boast about his skillful negotiations with Prigozhin after stating that Putin’s authority was not weakened during the armed rebellion in response to a journalist’s question.

Prigozhin’s ability to freely operate in Russia suggests that Prigozhin is still protected by some security guarantees and/or that the Kremlin continues to prioritize undermining his reputation in Russia over targeting Prigozhin physically or legally. Lukashenko noted that neither he nor Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to assassinate Prigozhin, and dismissed suggestions that Putin might attempt to kill Prigozhin in the future.[10] ISW assessed on June 27 that Putin has likely decided that he cannot directly eliminate Prigozhin without making him a martyr for causes concerning the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) mishandling of the invasion.[11] ISW also observed on June 27 that the Kremlin launched an information operation aimed at presenting Prigozhin as corrupt and a liar, and Russian state outlets have maintained this narrative since. Russian propaganda networks are extensively covering FSB’s raids of Prigozhin’s mansion and his wealth, and one journalist sarcastically called Prigozhin’s house a “palace belonging to the fighter against corruption” on Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1.[12]

Select Russian ultranationalists criticized Russian state propaganda for attempting to villainize Prigozhin, however, suggesting that the Kremlin’s attempt to alienate the ultranationalist community from Prigozhin is not succeeding. A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel accused the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs of deliberately leaking footage of the FSB raids to the media in order to portray Prigozhin as a traitor who is only interested in a lavish lifestyle.[13] Another Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel attempted to disprove Rossiya 1’s suggestion that the FSB may have found narcotics at Prigozhin’s mansion.[14] It is not necessarily surprising that Wagner-affiliated milbloggers are attacking Kremlin efforts to blackguard Prigozhi, but a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also condemned the Russian media’s efforts to portray Prigozhin as a corrupt individual, noting that Prigozhin’s home is consistent with that of a wealthy individual and that Prigozhin appears to showcase his military awards throughout his mansion.[15] Another milblogger noted that Prigozhin’s house did not appear that lavish when compared to other Russian billionaires.[16]


https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2023

Massive news in Ukraine today!

Let me try to explain.

Putin started this war to apparently 'de-nazify' Ukraine and his view was the worst of the 'Nazi's' were the Azov group, who were based in Mariupol on the Azov Sea.

Mariupol was the site of a major siege that lasted months based mainly on the Azovstal Industrial area in Mariupol which went on until the defenders basically ran out of food, water, medicine and ammunition and were ordered by President Zelenskyy to surrender as they had vowed to fight to the last man.

Russia claimed it as a great victory and intended to put the defenders on trial for their life's (and execute them).

What happened though was that a bloke called Viktor Medvedchuk who was a big mate/personal friend of Putin and was going to be installed as the new President of Ukraine following the so called 3 day victory Russia had believed it would be all it needed to capture Kiev (now called Kyiv) and the rest of Ukraine - was captured trying to flee Ukraine - and in the end he was traded for the five key commanders who fought at Azovstal.

The deal was these five would be released but be taken to stay in Turkey (now called Turkiye) under house arrest by Turkey's President Erdogan.

The hardcore Russian nationalist when absolutely berserk at this - how could they be fighting a war to de-nazify Ukraine when the top five 'Nazi's' of all were released just to get Putin's friend back???

(I must point out that these five, or indeed 99% of those fighting for Ukraine are NOT Nazi's at all and President Zelenskyy is himself Jewish!!!)

Well today is the 500th day of the war and President Zelenskyy just so happened to be visiting Turkey and the next thing we knew, the Azovstal 5 were allowed to fly home with him to Ukraine!

This is massive news for the Ukrainians and a massive snub by Erdogan to Putin - see the tweets below...










Note - the first two tweets are off a news site (so you can find the same sorts of reports everywhere) the third simply had a picture of Putin's spokesman - but again you can find his statement widely reported elsewhere and the final one is just the personal view of someone I follow for a general understanding of what is going on but he does seemed to have put down in words what many people are thinking - but this tweet is an opinion, the other three are factual.

Just to add on to the above, I've just found a Tweet from someone called Girkin.

Now Girkin (real name Strelkov) is another like Prigozhin (the bloke who commanded Wagner and marched on Moscow) who seems to be able to say absolutely anything without fear of being arrested or killed - he's clearly protected by people who Putin fears to cross -


Girkin's style is to take the piss but heavily laced with the truth!

Terrorist Girkin-Strelkov:

"If I were Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin], I would not risk accepting the proposal of Erdogan to meet him in Turkey. Because the probability is getting visibly higher that they will forget to inform our president about his forthcoming trip to the Hague..."

Girkin who I've mentioned before on this thread (see last post above) has been arrested.

He's an ultranationalist and has recently slagged off Putin for how the war is going.

Seems that Putin now fears the ultranationalists and has started to shut them up, Girkin being one of several who have been recently arrested.

In short Putin doesn't want public criticism anymore in Russia for how bad the war is going for them.

Seems the thinking goes something like this...

Putin has crushed all dissent in Russia from the usual suspects, the young, the liberals, the unions, etc, etc and up to now has allowed criticism from the ultranationalist of the Ministry of Defence over how poorly they have done in the war - so as to not take any personal blame.

That all changed with Prigozhin march on Moscow!

Now it is seen that Putin is vulnerable and needs to shut the ultranationalist down - hence the current purging of the more prominent ones.

An interesting short film about the rise of former Russian government critic Solovyov's conversion into Putin's mouthpiece - shortly after other government critics he interviewed were assassinated....

Sluffy wrote:

Not sure what the emoji is supposed to mean but I'm glad you are quoting Solovyov etc and following Julia Davis since I introduced them to you.

wanderlust wrote:

Sluffy wrote:

Not sure what the emoji is supposed to mean but I'm glad you are quoting Solovyov etc and following Julia Davis since I introduced them to you.

Oh you LIAR!

(No change there then!)

No you didn't.

Sluffy wrote:I've been following all this from the start of the war although I'm limited to following only the sources that are given in English - which are basically all from the Ukrainian side (they even translate (selective) Russian news / Russian military blogger sites) - so I try to be cautious in that what I read may well not all be true as such and there is probably more than a bit of 'poetic licence' about it all.

The main person out of the 20 or so I normally follow is a bloke called Dimitri...

Sluffy wrote:For anyone who may be interested the person posting this tweet 'Dimitri' is one of those I follow to get information of what is going on.

He states that he was born in one of the Baltic states (I forget which one) which was under Russian control at the time, of Russian parents (I think one of which was born in Ukraine) and his native language is Russian.  

He views himself as Russian.

He does though has lived in the Baltic state independent of Russia and currently works/lives in London.

He clearly doesn't like what Putin has done and strongly supports Ukraine.

I find his reports quite reasonable for most of the time although clearly mainly pro-Ukraine.

He's certainly worth a follow if you want to see what's going on in general.

In post 232 of this thread I posted a tweet from Dimitri which retweeted one of Julia Davis - it was YOU who discovered her from my post you numpty...

As a long-time viewer of these programs (in the past), this is one (with glasses) of the guys with "opposing views" they invite to make the program more believable. https://t.co/KdyTgkQeSR

— Dmitri (@wartranslated) September 11, 2022

And from my following of Julia Davis she had introduced me to the propaganda nutjobs like Solovyov a long, long time before I ever heard you made mention of him.

Interesting piece from Beau.

Fwiw both The Institute for the Study of War (Washington) and the UK Ministry of Defence have talked about the VDV in the past.

As Beau states they are an elite unit but took horrendous losses in the first weeks of the war as they spearheaded the failed attack on Kyiv,(Kiev as was).

The two institutions both analysed that the VDV were brought up to strength by the use of mobilised soldiers, which diluted their combat effectiveness.  They were also used as defensive units, whereas the elite guard unit which they are famed for is that of assault soldiers.

It is reckoned that by means of using the VDV as defence units it allowed them to preserve their trained soldiers and used the drafted in mobilised (and severely undertrained reinforcements) as basically canon fodder.

The numbers Beau was quoting may be right (who really knows?) but what is being suggested is that since the first weeks/months of the war (where the VDV lost a high number of their trained soldiers) that the numbers since are probably weighted heavily in their continued losses being mostly comprised of the untrained mobilised conscripts drafted into and fighting for the VDV rather than the trained elite troops they have left.

Even after saying all this the VDV as they are today (watered down in effect) are still regarded as one of Russia's best fighting units, compared to the rest of the Russian army.

Funnily enough I stumbled across the following tweet earlier which although being some months out of date does reconfirm the point Beau was making about the lack of first aid training of Russian soldiers leading to wounded dying on the battlefield rather than being saved long enough to be treated properly.

boltonbonce wrote:Interesting piece from Beau.

Now that’s how to wear a hat, tell a meaningful story and no sign of creepy moggies slouching around. Good one that Bonce

Whitesince63 wrote:

Now that’s how to wear a hat, tell a meaningful story and no sign of creepy moggies slouching around. Good one that Bonce

And nice to see Curious George  on the shelf.

Thought you might like to look at this interesting perspective of a serving Ukranian officer:

"I would like to address some potential upcoming risks for the coming winter and explore avenues for their mitigation. It's essential to emphasize that this perspective is based on open-source information and analysis, rather than insider insights, and should be regarded accordingly.



The current lack of air dominance and limited assault capabilities on both sides has brought us back to a state of attritional warfare, both in the South and the East. Artillery plays a pivotal role in this war, resulting in a higher ammunition expenditure compared to production capacity. 


To address this, the White House procured a substantial artillery ammunition batch from South Korea, supplemented by cluster munitions to avert shortages. I am not sure whether that can be replicated again in the coming year. Nonetheless, unless a significant operational breakthrough occurs, the situation remains tactically dynamic without producing strategic shifts. The potential liberation of Bakhmut by our forces or occupation of isolated areas near Kreminna-Svatove by Russians merely alters the map's appearance, while exacting a toll in terms of casualties without generating significant operational changes.


Russia's ammunition supply is not solely reliant on domestic production; external sources like North Korea and China could potentially bolster their arsenal, as suggested by Shoigu's visit to Pyongyang. This remains speculative, hinging on the provision of sufficient quantities by these nations. Speculation arises that russia might initiate a counter-offensive in the winter, boosted by additional ammo and human reserves from another partial mobilization. Concerns heighten as their loitering munition production escalates and shouldn't be dismissed. 


Comparatively, Ukraine lacks fortified defenses, with notable vulnerabilities even observable via open satellite imagery. I am of the belief that Putin's strategic objective is to bolster his position in the winter months, strategically accumulating negotiation leverage and demonstrating his commitment to sustaining the war of attrition. This timing is significant, particularly given the upcoming U.S. Presidential elections in 2024. It is apparent that he aims to capitalize on anti-Ukrainian sentiments during the election cycle, seeking to diminish prospects for continued assistance, as he anticipates the Russian invasion of Ukraine to be a pivotal subject in debates among candidates. This move is aimed to exert influence and potentially force West to agree with his agenda.


 I am equally convinced that Putin will initiate further rounds of missile and Shahed drone attacks, targeting essential infrastructure such as power plants, to undermine Ukraine's resilience during the winter. This strategy aims to erode Ukrainian resolve, foster war weariness, and gain a stronger position for negotiation leverage.


Nonetheless, I firmly believe that there are ways to mitigate it and avoid unfavorable circumstances: · Ukraine requires more air-defense capabilities to provide air-defense cover. In this question, we completely rely on our allies.

· To disrupt the enemy's ability to command and sustain logistics of large force concentrations, Ukraine needs extended-range capabilities. To reach necessary effect, it would require efforts of multiple countries.

· Defense preparations and the establishment of minefields need to be escalated if significant operational breakthroughs in the South or East won’t happen

· Collaboration between Ukraine and its Western allies should prioritize hybrid training initiatives. This involves joint training exercises conducted on Western training grounds, facilitated by seasoned Ukrainian officers and NCOs alongside Western instructors. This approach will yield practical training closely aligned with the on-ground realities.


Despite these challenges, there are some optimistic prospects that require acknowledgment:



- Notable disruptions to logistical pathways connecting Russia through Crimea to the South have substantially hampered Russian supply routes in the southern region.
 - The attrition ratio in the Southern region remains uncertain, and it's not beyond the realm of possibility that russian forces might weaken sufficiently to provide our troops with a chance for a breakthrough.
 - Uncertainty surrounds Russia's potential to sufficiently replenish artillery ammunition for the upcoming winter. Additionally, the concerning depletion of artillery barrels remains unresolved, casting doubt on Russia's ability to address this matter
. - The feasibility of another effective Russian mobilization remains unclear, as potential internal complications within Russia could impede such efforts.

- Recent Chinese involvement in Jeddah negotiations introduces the possibility that China may opt to avoid providing extensive aid to Russia, instead prioritizing diplomatic gains. This strategic approach mirrors China's prior actions in the realm of international relations, exemplified by brokering a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia.


In conclusion, although the outlook may appear grim, proactive measures can prevent these scenarios. By addressing this situation with a sense of urgency and preparing for worst-case scenarios, we can avoid future challenges. While I think that certain concerns might not materialize and may remain theoretical in nature, it remains imperative that we underscore the importance of readiness for these plausible scenarios, as they still hold a significant level of realism."

wanderlust wrote:Thought you might like to look at this interesting perspective of a serving Ukranian officer:

If you posted that specifically for me(?), then thank you but I already follow him (he's actually a reservist and not a serving officer - I very much suspect he's a retired former senior intelligence officer (he's certainly well connected with his information sources that's for sure)) -



He's recognised as being a reliable source of information (although the above is more opinionated than informational) as confirmed only today in the latest ISW (Washington) daily analysis...

A Ukrainian reserve officer who has previously reported accurately on Russian force dispositions reported on August 8 that according to satellite imagery, Russian authorities have recently based 12 to 16 Russian helicopters at the Luhansk International Airport.[28] The officer reported that these helicopters are outside the range of Ukrainian HIMARS and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs).[29] The officer asserted that the disabling of the helicopters would compel Russian forces to vacate the airport, which would slow Russian logistics and response times

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2023



If you are interested in analysis on the future of the war the one to follow is this one -

Rob Lee
@RALee85
Senior Fellow
@FPRI
. Previously
@USMC
,
@ColumbiaSIPA
,
@CentreAST
. Focused on Russian defense policy.
Joined November 2015
4,200 Following
670.2K Followers